The article examines the evolution of military operations by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) over the last three decades. By examining constitutional (treaty) developments and organizational practice, it questions whether these sub-regional organizations have displaced the primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in matters pertaining to international peace and security, as foreseen in articles 24(1) and 103 of the United Nations Charter (the UN Charter). The relevance of this question is underscored by the fact that ECOWAS and SADC have engaged in various peace operations since the 1990s. The article concludes that since all the interventions under discussion were underpinned by the consent of the recognized government, it would be premature to suggest that the practice of African sub-regional organizations amounts to the emergence of a new customary right to engage in 'first-instance enforcement action'.
Introduction
The article examines the evolution of military operations by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) over the last three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, both sub-regional organizations have engaged in peace operations in a manner that was difficult to imagine only a few years before. In addition, their constitutive documents underwent significant amendment in order to accommodate their new regional security role. These developments raise the question whether the practice of these sub-regional organizations challenges the primacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in matters pertaining to international peace and security, as foreseen in articles 24(1) and 103 of the United Nations Charter (the UN Charter).
In the subsequent sections, the article will briefly examine the meaning of the term 'regional organizations', whereafter it will consider the implications of Article 53(1) of the UN Charter for regional organizations. Of pertinent importance is whether and to what extent the UN Charter (still) requires prior authorization by the UNSC of a military intervention by a regional organization. Thereafter the contribution illuminates core aspects of the legal framework of ECOWAS and SADC pertaining to regional security. It further gives an overview of the respective military operations in which they have been involved up to date, followed by an assessment of the legal basis of these operations and their relationship with the UNSC.
The relationship between Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and regional organizations
Article 53(1) of the UN Charter determines that:
' [t] he Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.' The first pertinent question raised by Article 53(1) concerns the definition of 'regional arrangements or agencies' (which in this article is used interchangeably with the concept 'regional organizations'). The only article in the UN Charter that sheds light on this question is the first sentence of Article 52(1), according to which:
'[n]othing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action …' 8 From this article one can deduce that a regional organization should have the task of taking care of the peaceful settlement of disputes within its own region. 9 The term 'regional' implies a distinctive feature about the members of the organization, which is generally understood to be of a geographic nature. 10 It can either relate to the geographic region from which all the member states come, or to the geographic area in which the organization will operate, or a combination of these factors.
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. Both ECOWAS and SADC fulfil this requirement, as their respective membership is directed at countries from a particular geographic sub-region within Africa (hence the reference to sub-regional organizations). In addition, their activities are limited to their own region and amongst their own members -a characteristic which is also typical of regional organizations.
The extent to which these sub-regional organizations acted in accordance with Article 53(1) of the UN Charter when participating in peace operations will be analysed below. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to discuss the extent to which this article requires an (explicit) authorization to the regional organization for engaging in enforcement action. The second sentence of Article 53(1) of the UN Charter explicitly determines that no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the UNSC.
13 Already in 1962 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defined 'enforcement action' as coercive military action in terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. 14 This in turn implies that Article 53(1) will only come into play in situations where the UNSC has made a prior determination that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression exists. This fact combined with the clear wording of Article 53(1) indicates that the legality of a mandate for enforcement action by a regional organization is dependent on an explicit, prior UNSC authorization to this effect.
Where no such authorization exists, the regional intervention would be illegal, unless it amounts to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, or to military measures which do not amount to coercive measures and therefore fall beyond the scope of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. These include peace-keeping ('Chapter VI ½') operations performed with the consent of the affected state(s), in a neutral manner during which force is used only in self-defense. 15 It also includes military action by one or more state(s) in another upon the request of the latter's lawful government (intervention by invitation). 16 One concretisation of intervention by invitation is Article 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, 17 according to which member states can request intervention from the AU in order to restore peace and security.
Some authors have persistently argued that regional organizations have a residual power to adopt enforcement measures when the UNSC remains inactive in situations of gross and systematic human rights violations. 18 This argument is underpinned by the rational that the chances for abuse of the military mandate by a regional organization is less likely, due to the institutional and collective control provided within the regional body, as well as by the higher ________________________________________________________________________ 20 Moreover, it also negates the fact that the UNSC may be deliberately refraining from action, because the major powers are not convinced that enforcement action is called for. Another problem with this argument is that it seems to assume that the UNSC could prevent the respective regional organization from intervening by adopting a Chapter VII resolution to that affect. 21 However, any such decision could be frustrated in practice by a veto of a permanent member who is silently condoning the illegal military operation. This is a real risk where the interests of a permanent member of the UNSC coincide with those of a regional (defence) organization. It is also aggravated where the institutional structures and controls exerted by regional organizations are rudimentary in practice, enabling the enforcement action to be dominated by the interests of the more powerful nations within the regional organization.
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The central role of the UNSC in authorizing any enforcement action, including those aimed at protecting the civilian population against gross human rights violations, was affirmed by the World Summit Outcome of 2006. This document, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), acknowledged that where a state failed to protect its population against suffering or serious harm resulting from internal armed conflict, the international community had a residual responsibility to do so. In such circumstances the principle of non-intervention yielded to the 'international responsibility to protect' which can also include military action. 23 Despite these objections, it remains to be determined whether the practice of some regional organizations may nonetheless be indicative of an emerging customary exception to the requirement that enforcement action by regional organizations be preceded by a UNSC resolution. For example, when a regional organization engages in a military operation without prior UNSC authorization, it is possible that such authorization can be forthcoming ex post facto, thereby retroactively legalizing the intervention. 26 Even though this practice would not find any textual basis in the UN Charter, it cannot be excluded that the UNSC could develop a practice of ex post facto authorization. The military interventions in the 1990s by the ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone are often cited as examples of interventions by a regional organization that was authorized by the UNSC ex post facto. As this point will be revisited below in sections 3.1.1. and 3.1.2, it will suffice here to say that in order for such an authorization to be convincing, it has to be given in unambiguous terms. Otherwise regional organizations (or states) could attempt to justify unauthorized, unilateral interventions on the basis of obscure language in subsequent UNSC resolutions which were not intended for that purpose.
Military interventions by ECOWAS and SADC

3.1.ECOWAS
Founded in 1975, ECOWAS comprises 15 member states. 27 Originally concerned with economic cooperation and integration among member states, the proliferation of conflicts in the region and its impact on economic development resulted in a restructuring of the organization's objectives in order to focus on regional security challenges.
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The founding treaty was first complemented by the Protocol on Non-Aggression of 22 April 1978 which was based, inter alia, on the consideration that the organization could not attain its objectives without the establishment of a peaceful atmosphere and harmonious understanding between the member states. This protocol also contained a clause on the peaceful settlement of disputes. 29 supported actively from outside that would be likely to endanger security and peace in the whole region.
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The revised Treaty of ECOWAS of 1993 consolidated the framework for the member states to collaborate towards the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region. Article 58(2) commits member states to cooperate with the Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts. 32 This commitment was concretized through the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security of 1999 (hereinafter the ECOWAS Peace-Keeping Protocol) that established an elaborate regional peace and security mechanism, including peacekeeping forces that could also be deployed in instances of internal conflict.
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The formal relationship of ECOWAS with the United Nations in relation to military intervention is ambivalent. The revised ECOWAS Treaty merely states that the organization will 'cooperate' with the United Nations system in the pursuit of its objectives. 34 The PeaceKeeping Protocol for its part states that in accordance with Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter, it will inform the United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in accordance with the ECOWAS Peace-Protocol. 35 The term 'inform' suggests that ECOWAS foresees the conduct of future interventions without prior UNSC authorization and that it will merely keep the United Nations up to date about a particular military operation.
However, the military operations thus far undertaken by ECOWAS illustrate that in practice ECOWAS is dependent on logistical, financial and military support from notably western countries within the United Nations system. This was perhaps less evident during the first two ECOWAS interventions in the 1990s, namely in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The military presence of Nigeria during these operations enabled their performance without direct support by the United Nations. In fact, some still regard these operations as the first clear instances where the United Nations' role was limited to authorizing the operations ex post facto, as point that will be revisited below. However, since the turn of the century Nigeria has limited its military involvement in ECOWAS operations and in doing so exposed the organization's financial and logistical co-dependency on the United Nations. Its operations in _________________________________________________________________________ This division of powers between ECOMOG and the UNOMIL combined with the fact that the latter would not be engaging in enforcement measures, 46 have been interpreted as implying that ECOMOG was engaged in enforcement action. 47 It is nonetheless open to question whether the vague language used in the UNSC resolutions would amount to an ex post facto authorization of military enforcement action. First, the language is broad and vague enough to apply only to those aspects of the intervention that constituted classic peace-keeping (consented to by the government and rebel groups, at least initially ). 48 In addition, the fact that UNOMIL, was not to engage in enforcement action does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that ECOMOG was indeed authorized to do so, as one could also argue that such support resulted from the very fact that no enforcement operation was authorized. One should also keep in mind that in the post-Cold War era, the Security Council has always referred explicitly to Chapter VII when authorizing military intervention. 49 In essence therefore, the language of the resolutions combined with the ambiguous circumstances under which they were adopted does not lend convincing support to an argument of ex post facto ratification of the ECOMOG intervention. 
The intervention in Sierra Leone
The involvement of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone was surrounded by similar ambiguities to those in Liberia, including subsequent praise by the UNSC which some interpreted as an ex post facto authorization of the continued military intervention. 51 The wake of this decision there were several violent incidents between ECOMOG troops and those attempting to undermine the embargo.
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Although the UNSC supported the mediation efforts initiated by ECOWAS and supported their objectives to reinstate the legitimate government in a Presidential Statement, 55 it did not authorize them to use force to realize these objectives. The only authorization to this extent concerned the enforcement of a United Nations arms and petroleum embargo against Sierra Leone, which was imposed by Resolution 1132 of 8 October 1997. 56 After determining that the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region, the UNSC adopted the embargo in order to persuade the military junta to relinquish power and make way for the restoration of the democratically elected government. 62 Ibid, at para. 6. 63 Ibid, at para. 9. were made under Chapter VII or VIII, or contained language that would ex post facto authorize ECOMOG to engage in enforcement action.
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As in the case of the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, one can argue that a UNSC mandate was superfluous, as the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone occurred on the invitation of the democratically elected government. 66 Even though this government had been overthrown and were not in effective control of the country, it was still almost universally recognized as the legitimate government of Sierra Leone, which could invite military support from ECOMOG. 67 In essence therefore, the complex context in which the UNSC statements concerning the ECOMOG involvement in Sierra Leone were made, makes claims of ex post facto UNSC authorization tenuous. Following the threat of a mutiny against President Bernardo Vieira in 1998, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1216 of 21 December 1998, resulting in an ECOMOG inter-position force for the purpose of maintaining security along the border between Guinea Bissau and Senegal. The ECOMOG interposition force was also required to take military action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personal in the discharge of its mandate.
69
Although no mention of Chapter VII or Chapter VIII was made, the ECOMOG deployment was explicitly requested by President Vieira and was also agreed to by the leader of the mutiny. 70 The deployment consisting of troops from Benin, Gambia, Mali, Niger and Togo could therefore either be regarded as a classic peace-keeping mission or intervention by invitation. The ECOMOG forces were however not able to prevent President Vieira from being forced from power in May 1999 and was withdrawn shortly afterwards. 71 Key factors that undermined the success of the mission included the fact that the ECOMOG force was undermanned and heavily dependent on French and Portuguese logistical support. The absence of Nigeria -the military and economic power house of the region -further _______________________________________________________________________ undermined its capacity. The initial mandate of UNOCI included the monitoring of the ceasefire, as well as the assistance to the government of national reconciliation in maintaining law and order and disarmament of armed factions, humanitarian assistance and the protection of United Nations personnel. 77 The French forces for their part were authorized to contribute to general security, intervene against belligerent factions at the request of UNOCI and also use force beyond the deployment of UNOCI. 78 SADC is currently composed of 14 member states. 83 The membership of the DRC, which only joined SADC in 1997, remains contentious due to its geographic position. 84 The 1992 SADC treaty only contained general references to regional peace and security issues. Article 5(1)(c) determined that it was an objective of SADC to promote and defend peace and security. Article 21 further determined that politics, diplomacy, international relations and peace and security was an area of cooperation. 85 In 1996 the security framework was complemented by the adoption of the Botswana Communiqué by the SADC Heads of State and Government. The Communiqué added the principle that military intervention of whatever nature shall be decided only after all possible political remedies have been exhausted in accordance with the Charter of the (then still existing) OAU and the United Nations. It further established the SADC Organ of Politics, Defense and Security (hereinafter the SADC Organ), which inter alia had the aim of protecting the people of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression. 86 the Lesotho intervention came at the time when Zimbabwe together with Namibia and Angola had sent troops to the DRC to support the Kabila regime, also formally claiming that it was a SADC intervention. The intervention thus came across as a political trade-off between member states pursuing their national interests at the expense of the organization. 108 However, from a military perspective the intervention in Lesotho was a success, despite a difficult start that resulted in several casualties. It succeeded in restoring order, a coup was prevented and SADC assisted Lesotho in reforming its electoral system. 109
Conclusion
The above analysis reflects a marked distinction between the formal policy of sub-regional organizations in Africa regarding regional security and the practical reality. The revised legal framework and official policy initiatives of ECOWAS and SADC reflect ambitious security goals and a pro-active approach to peace operations which would have been difficult to imagine before the turn of the century. In the case of ECOWAS this approach also reflects a formal willingness to operate independently from the UNSC. However, ECOWAS' recent practice pertaining to peace operations reflects the organization's dependence in practice on the (western members of the) United Nations for logistical, financial and military assistance. This reality makes any full-scale military intervention by ECOWAS without a UNSC authorization unlikely.
Since the adoption of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in 2001,
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SADC for its part explicitly acknowledges the need for a UNSC resolution in instances of enforcement action. Thus far the organization has only engaged in two military operations, both of which occurred during the late 1990s. The intervention in the DRC exposed the fact that SADC faced logistical, military and financial constraints similar to that of ECOWAS. As a result, any comprehensive future military operation in the region would only be likely to materialize if -in addition to a formal authorization by the UNSC -material support was forthcoming from the United Nations.
As far as the legal bases of past ECOWAS and SADC peace operations were concerned, it is important to underscore that all these operations were carried out on the invitation of the recognized government and sometimes also with the consent of rebel groups. This would imply that the principles of intervention by invitation or even classic peace-keeping would constitute the primary legal bases for these interventions. Both principles are well established in international law and do not amount to a violation of Article 2(4) of the UNSC. This in turn would imply that a UNSC authorization, whether prior or ex post facto, would not have been necessary in these instances -if and to the extent that the scope and duration of the mandate remained in line with the consent given. Moreover, even if a consensual military mandate evolved beyond the consent given by the respective government, this would first and foremost amount to a violation of the mandate in question, rather than a shift in the legal benchmarks for enforcement action. The practice of both ECOWAS and SADC are too nuanced to serve as clear examples of an emerging independence of regional organizations vis-à-vis the UNSC in relation to enforcement action. The above analysis of the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone revealed that the complex context in which these peace operations took place, make them unsuitable as convincing examples of an ex post facto authorization practice by the UNSC. Furthermore, in the case of the ECOWAS the intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, a UNSC authorization under Chapter VII subsequently complemented the consensual basis of the ECOWAS mandate. This UNSC resolution paved the way for the integration of the ECOWAS mission in a United Nations mission. This division of labor in accordance with which ECOWAS handed over the mission to the United Nations was based on practical considerations rather than on any new legal basis for military intervention.
In essence therefore it seems premature to suggest that the practice of African sub-regional organizations amounts to the emergence of a new customary right to engage in 'firstinstance enforcement action'. 111 Given the socio-economic realities within the ECOWAS and SADC regions and the continent as a whole, they will remain dependent on the financial and logistical support of the United Nations during peace-keeping operations for some time to come. This makes it unlikely that these organizations will contribute to any military practice that creates or confirms the right of regional organizations to engage in peace-enforcement independently from the UNSC.
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